

*Gregory's draft*  
*Review of the two*  
*messages from Carter for*  
*hand to the Review Staff*  
*at 10:30 AM. The draft*  
*was made*  
*W.H.H.*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary CPSU  
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to  
(Secretary General, Brezhnev,  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter (Counselor  
MFA Second EUROPEAN <sup>Department</sup> Division)  
W. Averell Harriman  
Peter Swiers, Assistant to Governor Harriman

DATE/TIME

September 20, 1976, 11 a.m.

PLACE:

~~Catherine Palace~~ <sup>The Senate</sup> Kremlin, Moscow, USSR.

Secretary-General Brezhnev received me in his office on the  
third floor of the <sup>Senate building</sup> ~~Catherine Palace~~ in the Kremlin ~~mid-way~~  
through my visit to Moscow. He looked fit, vigorous and spoke  
without difficulty. Although there were some <sup>frank</sup> difficult things  
to say on both sides, I noted that the General Secretary made  
a particular effort to maintain a cordial atmosphere throughout  
our meeting which lasted 2 3/4 hours. The press release  
which we agreed on at the end referred to the meeting as  
"friendly and frank." <sup>Governor Carter, SALT, immigration and</sup>  
<sup>the rhetoric were the main issues.</sup>

Our conversation started with the usual cordialities and  
greetings and Brezhnev inquired as to how I had been spending  
my days in Moscow. I noted I had seen Arbatov and while  
complementing <sup>the President's</sup> them on their intellect, <sup>willingness</sup> I also noted that

~~22~~

Arbatov understands our faults and is frank in telling us <sup>about them</sup>

<sup>said he was</sup> Brezhnev ~~is~~ happy that someone understood the U.S. since he

did not. I told the General Secretary that I wish to applaud <sup>his</sup> commitment to peace. <sup>He</sup> thanked <sup>me</sup> him and showed me a recent

Ukraine publication which he promised to send to me. He noted that it was put out on the occasion of the <sup>installation</sup> ~~direction~~ of a bust of him in his "homeland" when he became twice a hero of the Soviet Union (Aleksandrov interjected a double hero rates a bust in his home town; in Brezhnev's case, Dneprodzerzhinsk).

Brezhnev said that was nice but he ~~did not~~ <sup>brought</sup> bring out the book to emphasize his ~~words~~ <sup>the honor</sup> rather than ~~dedication on the front~~ <sup>but the words</sup>

peace "fighter for peace." He said these words expressed the hope and aspiration of the Soviet people and showed me several pictures of places he had spent his minority and said he would honor my request to sign the inscription page,

I told Mr. Brezhnev that one of the reasons I had come to the Soviet Union this time was to attempt to give him an understanding of a <sup>new</sup> ~~new~~ <sup>personality</sup> ~~personality~~ of the American <sup>secretary</sup> ~~secretary~~ Governor Carter.

While one could never tell about an election beforehand, I believed there was more <sup>than</sup> ~~of~~ an even chance that Governor Carter would be president and Mr. Brezhnev would be having to deal with him. I told the General Secretary that Governor Carter was as dedicated as he <sup>was</sup> ~~to~~ the cause of <sup>peace</sup> ~~peace~~ and was ready to work with him to achieve it. I placed special emphasis

~~-2-~~

on the fact that Governor Carter would be our first president ←  
 who was ~~also~~ a nuclear engineer. I was sure that the General  
 Secretary was as happy ~~z~~ as I was that one of the first things  
 Governor Carter repudiated <sup>Reagan on 10/16</sup> was the current <sup>announced</sup> talk about the ←  
 feasibility of nuclear war which could ~~in~~ turn dangerously  
 lead to ~~talk~~ of total nuclear war. I told the General Secretary  
 that I had given Governor Carter the record of our 1974 con-  
 versation. One of the first things that Governor Carter ~~noted~~ <sup>agreed</sup>  
 was that the General Secretary not only wanted to control but ←  
 reduce the ~~number of~~ nuclear weapons. Brezhnev interjected  
 that was a correct report of his intentions.

I also ~~let~~ <sup>mentioned to Brezhnev</sup> the General Secretary know of Governor Carter ~~that~~ <sup>that I had told</sup>  
~~his willingness to cooperate with Brezhnev's suggestion that visits~~ <sup>is a thought it a good idea to exchange visits</sup>  
~~be exchanged amicably between the leaders of our two countries.~~ <sup>annually. I told the General Secretary that Carter</sup>  
~~I went on to say that Governor Carter recognized that one of~~ <sup>said if Brezhnev thought it useful, he would gladly cooperate.</sup>

the great difficulties of our relations is misunderstanding ←  
 on both sides. I repeated the 1974 remark that there are many  
 people in the U.S. who have undue ~~but nevertheless~~ fear of ←  
 Soviet intentions. I said that the Secretary General might  
 be surprised to know that there is considerable propaganda  
 going about the U.S. that the Soviets are preparing a first ←  
 strike as evidenced by an allegedly very active <sup>Soviet</sup> civil defense  
 against a second strike. Brezhnev shook his head <sup>sadly</sup> ~~very seriously~~  
 and commented that they don't know ~~in the U.S.~~ that there  
 would be a second strike in a half hour. I went on to say that

./ this makes it very important that both sides give accurate information not of course of the details of warheads but of the fact of their capabilities so that people on both sides know that neither country has any intention of a first strike.

[This is one of the reasons why Governor Carter is so strong for induction.] He asked me to insure that you understood that the current campaign rhetoric has no factual misunderstanding basis. the current campaign (add for foreign policy)

[Governor Carter has been travelling among the American people and although right wingers might be anti-Soviet, his impression might be in general ~~for~~ with the people in the Soviet Union. Governor Carter wished that this point be passed on to you.] He also requested me to ask you for some friendly gesture or statement of intention sometime before or after the elections which would ~~get~~ <sup>start</sup> him -- or President Ford if he should be the winner -- in the right direction. [I noted that Governor Carter has always been very careful to speak as a candidate but that in my judgment he would become President. Brezhnev at this point exclaimed <sup>in fact</sup> "Carter." I went on that I did not like to say anything unkind about Khrushchev whom I both knew and admired but I must cite (as an example) his unfortunately warlike speech of January 6, 1961 which started our relations off badly, and lead to unfortunate things in the early days

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of the Kennedy administration. [You should also note that Governor Carter is opposed to the Jackson amendment, ~~He has insisted~~ *as* that trade ~~not~~ be used in connection with <sup>EM</sup> immigration of Jews to Israel. I reiterated at this point the value of some overt *Soviet* demonstration or helpful statement to reduce tensions. *Although* I offered to stop then, Secretary Brezhnev asked me to go on *any other matters I had in mind* with some ~~of the particulars of my presentation.~~ *reference to that* I noted that

Governor Carter understands that Soviet cooperation is necessary for a Middle East settlement, that he fully anticipates Soviet *participation* cooperation, *in the future* and that he believes it is in your interest as well as in ours.

On internal affairs, Governor Carter intends in no way to interfere in ~~things~~ *internal affairs* of the Soviet Union but he is for ~~fully~~ supporting the ~~Helsinki agreement~~ *Helsinki agreement* in all *its* provisions, in particular the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. *as well as*

noted that *III* *which* *provision* Basket *is* an important *position* and is taken seriously by the American people. The <sup>am</sup> immigration of Jews is not a matter which can be put under the rug. It must be thrashed out to ~~keep it from~~ *becoming a* subject of controversy between us. At this point, <sup>KS</sup> Alexandrov and Sukhodrev interjected, asking whether Governor Carter had now made a public statement of support for all of the Helsinki agreement. I said that I <sup>did</sup> ~~do~~ not know but I recalled <sup>that</sup> he had spoken <sup>in</sup> ~~about~~ *factories* the reduction of arms in Europe (Brezhnev here commented to Alexandrov that this was odd. *He evidently does not appreciate how strongly* *our people feel about Soviet failure to carry out fully* *Basket III provisions*)

With Brezhnev in agreement, I then continued with some <sup>details</sup> ~~specifics~~ on ways Governor Carter believed we ~~could~~ *reduce and* restrict *strategic*

arms and ~~development~~ relations;

but also flight tests of

-- I said that not only could we reduce numbers ~~of~~ new weapons ~~but~~ <sup>by</sup> flight tests. ~~But~~ <sup>But</sup> our scientists are working hard <sup>reducing flight tests would be a way to stop development.</sup>

<sup>to me</sup> Agree not to ~~not~~ deploy ~~new~~ <sup>any</sup> strategic weapons for a few years. <sup>to</sup> Governor Carter is for expansion ~~for~~ cultural exchange

and hopes we can get into such fundamental questions as energy and nuclear fusion. Success may be 30 to 40 years off but working together <sup>today</sup> we could possibly speed it up.

-- In <sup>the</sup> immediate future, Governor Carter is interested in the development of trade, in particular, the need to obtain MFN. I said that Brezhnev knows the difficulties but we must together develop a program in order to reopen an issue which came to such an unhappy conclusion because of the Jackson and Stevenson amendments. I went on that there is feeling in the U.S. that it is the Soviets who ~~had~~ benefited from trade but my thinking is that we both benefited.

<sup>7</sup> Governor Carter believes we <sup>might discuss</sup> ~~should~~ talk where there will be cooperation and where there will be competition between us. He is willing to expand <sup>the</sup> ~~areas~~ <sup>of cooperation</sup> as widely as possible. He realizes that we have different political and social systems but feels strongly <sup>as a result</sup> that we must not take each other by surprise. <sup>(having things also in mind)</sup>

H10  
(Brezhnev noted to Aleksandrov ~~here~~ that ~~it~~ this was quite a bit. Alexandrov responded to him that it was much for Brezhnev but it was necessary.)

<sup>saying that I had</sup>  
I continued that ~~on~~ two points on which ~~I said~~ I was speaking for myself; namely that

-- ~~That detente had been~~ <sup>There had been an overreliance on detente for</sup> the American people.

I knew that the General Secretary respected President Nixon but when he was in trouble, he exercised detente ~~at home~~. Americans became <sup>at home, exaggerated detente</sup> as one wise man <sup>As said we had become our own</sup> told me ~~an~~ disillusioned with ~~an~~ illusion~~s~~.

I recalled that Secretary Brezhnev had said to me in 1974 - patience, perseverance and step by step <sup>action</sup> work was required for progress.

He had made it very clear (when I used the word illusion, Alexandrov interjected <sup>to be</sup> that they were substantive <sup>substantive</sup> illusions)

-- I <sup>said</sup> noted that the campaign Reagan conducted had stirred up

anti-Soviet emotions which has had an effect on the ~~Frank Carter-Ford~~ campaign. <sup>Frank Carter-Ford</sup> These are things which can be and must be, ~~Carter~~


~~believes~~ overcome. <sup>Governor</sup> I concluded that ~~General Carter~~ told me that he wanted me to be the channel <sup>of communication</sup> until the elections either directly or <sup>up Ambassador</sup> through Dobrynin. I told the ~~Soviet~~ General Secretary

that I would be glad to answer any questions or take any messages. ~~Afterwards Governor Carter would have his own~~

Secretary of State and I will ~~bow out~~. <sup>I said that</sup> ~~Governor Carter did not~~

~~the many people he would like to get into the act and~~

Partly reading and partly extemporizing, General Secretary Brezhnev began <sup>his presentation</sup> by expressing appreciation for <sup>my</sup> detailed explanation of Governor Carter's positions, ~~He took~~ particularly <sup>those</sup> ~~note of the positions~~ on strategic arms, Basket III and others. Brezhnev said that he was <sup>very</sup> pleased to hear what I had said. He ~~said~~ <sup>add</sup> that as regards the general Soviet approach to relations with the U.S., he ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ <sup>troubled that there was</sup> no reason to attempt to convince me because the whole world knows that the Soviet Union seeks <sup>steadfastly</sup> relations which ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ will ~~grow~~ ~~stand~~ ~~firmly~~ <sup>para 10</sup> on the basis of mutual advantage. He said that the Soviet Union is convinced that for such development there must exist certain necessary, ~~and~~ <sup>explained</sup> objective prerequisites and a good foundation. He ~~went on~~ <sup>stated</sup> that, as the result of efforts, which were not simple but <sup>were</sup> ~~would be~~ what he called <sup>would</sup> enormous, we now have accords and understandings which have achieved improvements not only in U.S.-USSR relations but for the world as a whole. Picking up my word, he said these are not illusions and <sup>K's</sup> Alexandrov added, these are real facts. Brezhnev said he had to emphasize that it was no fault of the Soviet Union that the process had slowed down, that ~~for~~ <sup>on</sup> several major issues there <sup>had been</sup> ~~was~~ a fairly protracted pause. He said that ~~he~~ <sup>I</sup> had spoken of the importance of strategic arms. He agreed with me. ~~And~~ <sup>I</sup> indeed this was the important subject <sup>and</sup> ~~but~~ he ~~XXXX~~ had to make one remark. He noted that on March 16 the Soviets had sent President Ford their latest proposal but had ~~as yet~~ received no answer. He asked, what does that ~~mean?~~ <sup>mean?</sup> He said that surely if that is the attitude now taken by the Administration, it is not a token of willingness or desire to achieve agreement. (I interjected here that when the General Secretary had finished his presentation, I would try to defend the Administration although <sup>I</sup> ~~he~~ was not for President Ford. Brezhnev agreed.)





Brezhnev continued that this of course results in the Soviets harboring a wariness of ~~the~~ trends in American policy. ~~XXX~~ He noted the trend manifested itself first and foremost in a renewed arms race and the American military budget which he believed was a record one. He complained that all of this was to the loud accompaniment of a mythical Soviet threat for which there were no grounds. ~~He said~~ ~~interjected that I agreed with this analysis.~~

Brezhnev continued that obviously forces ~~XXXX~~ were at work here (in the Soviet Union ~~A~~) who do not like either relaxation of international tension or development of U.S.-Soviet relations. He understood the <sup>U.S.</sup> Administration's ~~XXXX~~ meting it out to these forces for reasons of a momentary nature <sup>but</sup> ~~that~~ he felt this was a dangerous development.

<sup>Gov. Carter</sup> [Brezhnev said he would now like to ask what was ~~Gov. Carter's~~ stand on Vladivostok. Does he support it or does he not?] He then said, returning to the basic issue of relations, ~~XXXX~~ the Soviet Union is ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ pursuing a consistent line. He emphasized it was a line confirmed by the <sup>25th</sup> ~~20th~~ Party Congress. The Soviets were in favor of not abating efforts. They were prepared to interact and cooperate with all those who take a similar approach.

[He said he now wished to turn directly to Governor Carter. He noted that he was not acquainted with him and had no bias against him. His candidacy for the American presidency was a question for the American people and it was the American people who <sup>will</sup> ~~will~~ say what they want. At the same time] Brezhnev said that the Soviets were by no means insensitive to the political line of the next president. He emphasized that the Soviets followed very closely the statements of both the candidates. (Comment: This is consistent with a point Arbatov made

to me <sup>or</sup> Sept<sup>18</sup> that many high level Soviets are taking <sup>our</sup> campaign statements very seriously, perhaps too seriously. IV-202

Brezhnev said that on the one hand the Soviets could warmly salute Mr. Carter when he said that he is "in favor of good and friendly relations", that the "solution of major international issues is not possible without the Soviet Union" and when he spoke against the arms race and military budgets. Brezhnev continued, however, that at the same time, one could not fail to note Carter statements which would be hard to accord with a desire to improve relations. He asked how could one explain such <sup>Carter</sup> statements <sup>as</sup> that in relations with the Soviet Union ~~Governor~~ <sup>he</sup> ~~Carter~~ would take a harder line or that detente was only of benefit to the Soviet Union. Brezhnev added he believed there were several other statements which only could be taken as <sup>en</sup> ~~interference~~ in Soviet internal affairs or those of other socialist countries. He also alleged that there was a statement belittling the role of U.S.-Soviet relations. Brezhnev said if this is true, he felt here that the Democratic candidate not only fails to take into account the realities of today's world but comes into contradiction with other ~~of his~~ <sup>of his</sup> statements <sup>on</sup> working for peace with the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev said although he hadn't heard of it and wasn't sure of it, he did not recall having heard a reaction from Governor Carter on a Soviet proposal to renounce development of new strategic system which he had put forth at the ~~20th~~ <sup>25th</sup> ~~to be~~ <sup>presumably</sup> the 25th Party Congress.

Brezhnev went on that I had stressed the importance of strategic arms limitation. He said that the Soviets were in favor of neither side having an advantage, rather that equilibrium be the result. I interjected that I could have ~~XXXX~~ said this was exactly Governor Carter's view and

Brezhnev responded that this was good. <sup>#</sup> He went on that it was not hard for the Soviets to select that the American side in the SALT talks was seeking to avoid any limitation on certain of its own types of arms such as the strategic cruise missile, while at the same time attempting to extend that definition to Soviet weapons which by no means had strategic capabilities. He said that he was referring to the Soviet bomber which was usually called the Backfire in the U.S. He emphasized that this was absolutely ~~XX~~ not a good approach, that the agreement must be on the basis of equality and equilibrium, that there is no other way to achieve strategic arms limitation agreement. Brezhnev added that although he didn't wish to go into it again in detail since he has said it publicly, he has made proposals to ban the Trident <sup>and</sup> the B-1, and similar weapons in the Soviet Union. He said this was not accepted by the U.S. and construction was continuing. (I interjected that only the Trident was under construction and Brezhnev responded he knew <sup>that</sup> but the B-1 was <sup>now</sup> being tested.) ~~XXXXX I said, however, I was glad he raised the issue.~~

Brezhnev added two more points:

-- that the Soviet proposal for a ban on underground testing had not been accepted, and

[-- there has been much discussion on European matters and he takes note that Carter recently said that if need be, he would strengthen NATO and send <sup>more</sup> troops to Europe. (I interjected that I didn't recall these statements and Brezhnev said he read <sup>them</sup> a day or two ago). <sup>#</sup> Brezhnev went on, laughing as he said it, that in general on every issue the two candidates seem to try to vie in <sup>outspeaking</sup> ~~out~~ playing the other, that perhaps this was <sup>an American custom</sup> ~~not inconsistent~~. He recalled

*[Handwritten signature]*

that in a recent "Jewish-Zionist" Congress, one <sup>of them</sup> announced support for the "poor Soviet Jews" and then ~~X~~ the other. <sup>did it as well?</sup>

*(I took exception to this)*  
 responded, rather strongly ~~(that was true.)~~ *(I took exception to this)* X Again with some

heavy humor, Brezhnev ~~then~~ said I should not think he was trying to attack Governor Carter because he had no intention of heaping praise on President Ford either. ~~He~~ He continued that he had read the other day that President Ford had received in the White House the Ukrainian Cardinal Selby who had been expelled from the USSR and whom even the Pope had forbade <sup>to</sup> to continue political activity. He asked rhetorically whether President Ford was trying to be more catholic than the Pope. I responded by saying, why not and the General Secretary laughed. I continued that I would answer quickly *(although, I was not for President Ford)* I said that no one <sup>in America</sup> really cares very strongly about this issue but there are many Ukrainians in the U.S. and if ~~AM~~ the Ukrainians are happy, the President will get some votes.

*I reiterated that I had to say the act was not anti-Soviet.*

I continued that this was a good example of why Governor Carter *said* that the General Secretary should not pay attention to campaign rhetoric; that ~~they~~ <sup>we</sup> must differentiate between this and policy. ~~Brezhnev responded to me that~~ <sup>then asked</sup> therefore what was the true picture; what were people to think.

He said he recalled meeting certain statesmen for the first time, saying that he didn't know them personally but he ~~xxx~~ had heard what they said, therefore, how was he to know about Governor Carter and President Ford? (Here Brezhnev turned to Alexandrov and said, "Am I interfering in U.S. internal affairs?")

He then turned again to me to say what ~~you~~ told ~~me~~ help ~~ed~~.  
I I  
/He then said that/He didn't ~~XXXXXX~~ blame the General Secretary at all for being confused and ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ when he was finished would like to make a brief statement on the issue.

[ Brezhnev said he would like to send a brief message to Governor Carter that on the subject of trade <sup>commercial</sup> and ties, please place no pressure on the USSR; ~~that~~ "all" are in favor of development of trade without discrimination and mutual respect.] He then said to me that on a/person <sup>purely</sup> ~~MM~~ ~~XXXXX~~ to person basis, he wished to note that <sup>we would soon have</sup> ~~soon would be~~ the third American president with whom the Soviets had discussed trade. President Nixon, promised, President Ford promised and now Governor Carter <sup>might</sup> promise, but the cart ~~is was~~ <sup>right</sup> still/where it was. And the Senate and ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Congress continued to try to exert pressure on the Soviet Union. He noted that a package deal had been expected and the Soviets had promised lend-lease repayment. I re-emphasized at this point that Governor Carter was <sup>part of discussion</sup> ~~was~~ to discuss the issue.]

Brezhnev then asked me not to misunderstand but said he had to mention that in the Soviet view the U.S. Administration had taken an unseemly attitude toward the MIG-25 which had made a "forced landing" in Japan.

He also said that he took note of my mention of the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. He said that in the past five years 117,458 Jews have left. He chuckled that where they went, God only knew. They were supposed to go to Israel but often turned up elsewhere. He alleged that the restrictions applied only to those with strategic

secrets and that in the past five and one-half years  
there had been 2027 rejections/~~MM~~<sup>OR</sup> a total of only 1.5%  
of those allowed to leave. I asked how many were now  
left of the 2000, and he said that number remained.

He then said he took a ~~very~~ good view of Governor  
Carter's statement that the Soviet and American leaders should  
meet annually. He felt in this connection it might be  
useful for Governor Carter and him to get together soon  
after the elections. (if Carter wins) I interjected here  
that I wanted him to ~~not~~<sup>make clear</sup> that what Carter had ~~accepted~~<sup>accepted</sup> was  
<sup>Brezhnev's</sup> suggestion to President Nixon that there be annual  
meetings, ~~and did so gladly~~<sup>of Brezhnev's statement with Brezhnev's</sup> which Brezhnev said he so  
believed. ~~When~~<sup>When</sup> I asked whether the General Secretary was  
finished with all his scoldings, he said no, he had one  
more and asked why on earth had Secretary Kissinger taken  
it into his head to go traveling all over Africa. He said  
he even thought about it in bed; he couldn't do it sitting  
up. More seriously, he ~~alleged to understand~~<sup>said in ironic manner that he understood</sup> Secretary  
Kissinger's desire to strengthen reactionary regimes  
~~continued~~<sup>condemned</sup> by the UN, ~~didn't want to go into that part~~<sup>He wanted that he</sup>  
further, but on Namibia, Secretary Kissinger was acting  
counter to the UN resolution when he talked about a two  
year period before independence. Brezhnev noted that he  
was saying this in spite of many and fruitful meetings with  
the Secretary but of course he also talked to him frankly.

After  
 If Brezhnev had concluded his presentation ~~xxxxx~~ I began my  
 response. [ I opened ] by saying that I ~~felt~~ <sup>felt</sup> as I ~~do~~ <sup>did</sup> when a little  
 boy being ~~caught~~ <sup>talked</sup> up by the head ~~teacher~~ <sup>master</sup> being ~~atoned~~ <sup>to atone</sup> not only  
 for my faults but for the acts of ~~others~~ <sup>all the members of my class</sup>. I ~~said that it was~~  
 a ~~joke but trusted~~ the General Secretary understood my meaning.  
~~Brezhnev said he appreciated it.~~

[ I said that Brezhnev had asked me one question in particular —  
 whether Carter was in favor of the Vladivostok Agreement. I  
 wanted to let him know ~~but~~ that ~~General~~ <sup>Governor</sup> Carter ~~felt his~~ <sup>did not principle but</sup>  
~~feelings~~ <sup>feelings</sup> were too high. Brezhnev interjected whether I meant  
 those of 2400 and 1320 to which I responded affirmatively. I  
 continued that concerning the difficulties of the ~~backfire~~ <sup>missiles</sup> and  
~~cruse~~ <sup>missiles</sup> I ~~did~~ not know Governor Carter's  
 exact position nor the full content of the Brezhnev-Kissinger  
 exchanges. ] I continued that I was going to try to defend  
 President Ford and Secretary Kissinger for not making more  
 progress on Salt. I ~~said that as an American it was my duty.~~  
 I also let the Secretary General know that ~~he~~ had informed ~~the~~  
 President and the Secretary that I would be ~~coming~~ <sup>traveling</sup> to Moscow.  
 Brezhnev interjected here ~~to my surprise~~ that he was aware of  
 this.

~~President Ford~~  
 I then ~~went on~~ that President Ford had been challenged for the  
 Republican ~~Administration~~ <sup>Nomination</sup> by the extreme right ~~was~~ represented by

*Ex*

Governor Reagan. I said that when even Senator Goldwater opposed <sup>Governor</sup> ~~Senator~~ Reagan, the Secretary General could understand just how extreme <sup>Reagan</sup> ~~he~~ was. ~~He~~ <sup>I</sup> said it was fair to say that President Ford's hands were tied during this period because if he had acted otherwise, Governor Reagan would have <sup>accused</sup> ~~accepted~~ him <sup>at</sup> ~~for~~ giving in. <sup>no matter what the deal was</sup> The Salt subjects are so complicated that it is difficult to explain the <sup>on</sup> ~~Administrative~~ position to the <sup>American</sup> public.

✓

(Brezhnev then said laughingly that he was going to try to bring to Governor Carter's attention that I had attempted to defend President Ford which I took in the same humor.)

✓

I continued that as late as May, I had <sup>had</sup> lunch with the Secretary who was going to try ~~to~~ <sup>said he</sup> for some sort of <sup>composition</sup> ~~agreement~~ on the cruise missile issue. I also said that <sup>you do it that</sup> Governor Carter had recognized that there might be an agreement but that he was ~~definitely~~ against making any political capital ~~out of~~ by attacking it. Governor Carter <sup>felt</sup> ~~believed~~ that the earlier there was an <sup>to</sup> ~~agreement~~ to <sup>limit</sup> ~~check~~ arms, the earlier <sup>we</sup> ~~he~~ could move to reduce arms. General Secretary then commented that that was exactly what had been talked about at Vladivostok-~~and~~ as soon as <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~Salt II Agreement~~ would be signed, the U.S. and Soviet Union would begin to discuss reductions.

✓

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I said I did not know how many more things I could tell him about the Governor but among others Carter has come out for reduction in the Ford <sup>military</sup> budget. I noted that Carter ~~comes~~ <sup>came</sup> out for this cut in spite of an apparently large flow of information from the Soviet Union that the ~~Soviet~~ <sup>Soviet</sup> were building up their conventional forces in Europe <sup>more</sup> ~~the~~ tanks, <sup>more</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>troops and quality</sup> of equipment. I then asked if I might take the rule of school teacher since I had been a pupil for a while, ~~at which~~ Brezhnev said, Please, please. I said that I had once given an opinion to Churchill about British <sup>politics</sup> which he did not like. Churchill lectured me that no one <sup>could</sup> understands the politics of other countries, <sup>and</sup> few <sup>are</sup> so gifted as to understand their own.

I said I wanted to explain something concerning the current campaign in the U.S. ~~I said that~~ in 1940, there were two Republicans running for the nomination for President — Taft, who was completely an isolationist, and Willkie, who was more sensible. I, as a Democrat, contributed to Willkie to <sup>help</sup> get the nomination ~~away~~ from Taft. Drawing a diagram, I then explained that if one looks at Taft on the extreme right, Roosevelt would also have to move to the right even though he would still be left of Taft. However, if Willkie were in the center, then Roosevelt <sup>could</sup> remain on the left. In a similar matter, <sup>in 1976,</sup> Ford was pulled farther to the right by Reagan, and Carter, although still left of Ford, had to move to the right ~~to avoid~~ in his public statements <sup>in</sup> to avoid being ~~just~~ isolated. I said if this had not happened — that is, <sup>order</sup> there had not been a Reagan pulling <sup>Ford</sup> Carter to the

right, there would ~~not~~ be a Vladivostok agreement. Brezhnev  
 commented that ~~there was~~ a complicated issue. ~~(following~~  
 American politics were ~~and turned to Alexandrov on an unheard~~  
 American politics ~~could not be a~~ point to which Alexandrov responded that in this conversation  
 the General Secretary could not say ~~it~~ exactly.)

I then went on to express my opinion that Carter should be  
 able to control the Pentagon as Nixon & Ford could not.

I continued that concerning ~~his~~ <sup>Brezhnev's</sup> question about the secretary in  
 Africa, I ~~do~~ <sup>did</sup> not know too much about it but did not think it  
 would do either ~~of our countries~~ any good to impugn ~~the~~ American  
 motives publicly (Brezhnev turned to Alexandrov saying "We made  
 it public?"). I continued that I could say ~~something~~ <sup>in private his statement</sup> with  
 great assurance namely, that the black vote represents a ~~great~~ <sup>and I was opposed to discrimination</sup> ~~large~~ <sup>part</sup>  
 part of our population. ~~President Ford~~ <sup>NO</sup> could not come out ~~as~~ <sup>for</sup>  
 white supremacy ~~because~~ <sup>without</sup> it would insure his defeat.

I then said that I had come to the limit of my support for Ford  
 and Kissinger. <sup>Foreign policy</sup> I noted that I always supported the Secretary  
~~for~~ <sup>deduction</sup> ~~on~~ <sup>ten signs</sup> ~~the~~ ~~removal~~ ~~of~~ ~~intentions~~. Of course,  
 I was against ~~his~~ <sup>Kissinger's</sup> method of resolving the Vietnam question.

I then added a prediction that the General Secretary would like  
 Governor Carter and that ~~he~~ <sup>Carter</sup> would like ~~to~~ General Secretary. I  
 found both of them direct, fully informed and fully committed to  
 peace. I then handed him a copy of Governor Carter's book

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story

beliefs

noting that it was not a political book but a human book. I  
 said it describes ~~how he was brought up~~ <sup>Governor Carter's background</sup> and his ~~feelings~~ <sup>beliefs</sup>. I  
 noted that he had written it ~~me~~ himself. I ~~also~~ gave the  
 General Secretary a copy of my own memoirs of 1941-1946. I  
 noted that I hoped that one day it could be translated into  
 Russian as it had not been badly reviewed in the Soviet Union.

will lock

press. Court for fear of

(INSERTION AT TAB A) The General Secretary came around the  
 table to ~~say thank you~~ <sup>express his</sup> and to ask me to accept his hand. The  
 General Secretary said that he wanted to say once again that  
 the Soviets were favorable to a meeting with the new U.S.  
 administration. <sup>Whom ever was elected.</sup> He thanked me for the meeting and was  
 glad that ~~my opinions on Governor Carter~~ <sup>To learn of</sup> had ~~his full knowledge~~ <sup>'s of business.</sup>  
 and consent.

He laughed that I had caught him by surprise  
 in giving him the two books and picked up a <sup>work</sup> design made of  
 semi-precious ural stones to give me. I <sup>then gave</sup> also passed him a  
 pair of cuff links that I said my wife made sure I brought  
 along. As we moved toward the door <sup>had</sup> Brezhnev responded  
 about Chairman Kosygin whom I had known since 1942. Brezhnev  
 told me that <sup>Kosygin</sup> he was expected to be back at work in a few weeks.

Curt from XEROX

We also discussed the <sup>crop</sup> weather this year which Brezhnev noted  
 that the harvest <sup>was</sup> expected to be better ~~me~~ even than in 1973.

Which was needed

He laughed that ~~even~~ <sup>every week</sup> the American projections about the Soviet  
 harvest kept rising. <sup>I</sup> He said that <sup>Gorbunov</sup> Carter would want to talk  
 to him about <sup>world</sup> the food. Salt came up as a point again and  
 Secretary General asked me to remember one more important  
 point -- that he had dedicated his life to prevent nuclear

TK

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war. With considerable emotion, he noted one political bomb  
~~aspect in a~~ <sup>falls and we have</sup> world war. I emphasized again the value of  
 the Soviets saying something to relieve tensions which would  
 then make it possible for <sup>the great benefit</sup> Carter to respond. I said I was  
 glad that Brezhnev did not talk of liberation wars the way  
 Krushchev did: <sup>he spoke only of support for national</sup> movements.

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We concluded our conversation by asking about the press and  
 Alexandrov produced a statement <sup>which with minor changes was approved (As read released)</sup>. I emphasized that I was  
 here as a private citizen <sup>and although Carter knew, it was my</sup>  
 idea. <sup>As</sup> ~~After the first draft referred only to my conversation~~  
 as "frank" <sup>and</sup> it was explained that that word alone could be  
 misinterpreted. Brezhnev agreed to add "friendly" as an

description of the <sup>meeting</sup>. As we reached the door, Brezhnev  
 pulled my assistant aside for a minute and asked him if he  
 thought the conversation had gone <sup>well</sup> ~~right~~ to which my  
 assistant replied affirmatively.

Handwritten signature or initials

My assistant also ~~then~~ <sup>KS</sup> let Alexandrov know what Brezhnev had  
 told him and emphasized that <sup>my</sup> ~~Harriman's~~ presentation was the  
~~only~~ one the Soviets should accept as <sup>an accurate description of</sup> ~~coming from~~ <sup>Government</sup> Carter's policy.  
 Aleksandrov made a point of his own - just as we asked  
 the Soviets to understand campaign rhetoric, we should understand  
 that the Soviets did not always control their press - as in the  
 case of Secretary Kissinger's trip to Africa.

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